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INTRODUCTION 
“That it is better 100 guilty Persons should escape than 
that one innocent Person should suffer, is a maxim that has 
been long and generally approved,” Benjamin Franklin, 1785.1  
 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Santa Clara University School of Law. My thanks to 
Professor Kathleen “Cookie” Ridolfi for her helpful guidance in this endeavor. 
 1.  Albert H. Smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, 293, (vol. 9 1906) 
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That maxim, in one form or another, has been repeated 
throughout history2 and has permeated the legal system.3  It is 
a part of Supreme Court precedent4 and taught not just in law 
schools, but in grade schools as well.5  Worldwide, this truism 
has been accepted by many different cultures.6 
The legal system in the United States is based upon the 
foundation of the Constitution.  Within that Constitution are 
certain rights that conform to the founding fathers’ ideal.  The 
Fourth Amendment provides the right to be secure in our 
homes, free from unlawful search and seizure without probable 
cause.7  The Fifth Amendment provides the right to protection 
against self-incrimination and requires due process of law 
before a person may be denied life, liberty or property.8  The 
Sixth Amendment provides that a person charged with a crime 
has the right to the effective assistance of counsel and to a 
compulsory process for obtaining favorable evidence in his 
case.9 
However, what should the legal system do when the rights 
of one person are pitted against the rights of another?  How 
can we reconcile allowing one person to exercise their rights 
when the exercise of those rights pose a threat to the life of 
another?  What would you think if I told you that there is 
currently a loophole within the legal system that not only 
allows a known guilty party to remain free, but also allows an 
innocent person to suffer for that crime while officers of the 
court are aware of the truth?10  As shocking and outlandish as 
this may sound, this loophole scenario has occurred numerous 
times, resulting in innocent people spending a large portion of 
 
(letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan, Mar. 14, 1785). 
 2.  See Alexander VolokhVlokh, n Guilty Men, 146 University of 
Pennsylvania L. Rev. 174–76 (1997) (citing numerous high profile individuals 
throughout history using some form of this maxim in notes 1–15). 
 3.  Id.  
 4.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371–72, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 
(1970).  
 5.  Dorsey D. Ellis, A Comment on the Testimonial Privilege of the Fifth 
Amendment, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 829, 845, 845 n.87 (1970).  
 6.  See Alexander VolokhVlokh, n Guilty Men, 146 University of 
Pennsylvania L. Rev. 173 (1997) (Citing numerous high profile individuals 
throughout history using some form of this maxim notes 119–127). 
 7.  U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 8.  U.S. Const. amend. V. 
 9.  U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
 10.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
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their lives in prison for a crime they did not commit.11  This 
kind of result completely eviscerates the purpose behind the 
justice system.  The purpose of the criminal legal system is to 
provide justice to those who are wronged, not to inflict 
punishment on those individuals the system knows are 
innocent. When a person spends time in prison for a crime that 
he or she did not commit, while the true perpetrator has 
confessed, there is a real problem that must be fixed. 
Part II of this Comment will provide examples of actual 
cases in which these injustices have occurred and the problems 
unique to each.  Part III will provide the legal ethics 
requirements and will discuss the legal loophole that allowed 
these injustices to occur, the many theories that have been 
proposed to fix the problem and why they have not yet proven 
to be a reliable solution.  Part IV will proceed to propose a new 
solution based on the introductory maxim.  While the solution 
may perhaps seem extreme, I hope to demonstrate that an 
extreme solution is justified by the founding principles of the 
legal system. 
I. EXAMPLE CASES 
A. Alton Logan Case 
On January 11, 1982, two men committed a robbery at a 
McDonald’s in Chicago, Illinois.12  During the course of that 
robbery a security guard, Lloyd Wickliffe, was killed by a 
shotgun blast and another security guard, Alvin Thompson, 
was wounded.13  Both guard’s’ handguns were taken, though 
no money was stolen.14  On February 5, 1982, one of the 
perpetrators, Edgar Hope, was arrested after fatally shooting 
a police officer; he was still carrying the gun he had taken from 
Thompson at the McDonald’s robbery.15  There was no way 
Alton Logan could have known that this incident would not 
only change his life, but steal a great portion of it from him due 
to the loophole in the legal system’s ethical rules. 
 
 11.  See example cases infra Part II. 
 12.  Maurice Possley, Inmate’s freedom may hinge on secret kept for 26 years, 
Chicago Tribune (Jan. 19, 2008), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-01-
19/news/0801180946_1_security-guard-attorney-client-privilege-andrew-wilson. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
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On February 7, 1982, Alton Logan was arrested and 
charged, along with Hope, for robbery and murder.16  This 
arrest was based on a tip to the police and the erroneous 
testimony of three eyewitnesses who identified Logan as a 
participant in the McDonald’s robbery and murder.17  Alton 
Logan and Edgar Hope would later be convicted of the 
McDonald’s robbery.18  Hope was sentenced to death, while 
Logan was sentenced to life in prison.19 
On February 9, 1982, only two days after Alton Logan’s 
arrest in the McDonald’s case, two Chicago police officers were 
shot to death.20 Brothers Andrew Wilson and Jackie Wilson 
were arrested and charged with the murders.21  While 
investigating this case, police recovered not only the weapons 
used to kill the police officers but also a cache of other weapons, 
including the murder weapon used in the McDonald’s case.22  
The guns were found hidden at a location where Andrew 
Wilson was known to stay.23  Police and prosecutors never 
pursued the connection between the killing of the police officers 
and the McDonald’s murder.24 
Two Cook County assistant public defenders, Dale 
Coventry and Jamie Kunz, were appointed to represent 
Andrew Wilson in the officer murders.25  A few weeks later, 
Coventry and Kunz were approached by Marc Miller, Edgar 
Hope’s defense attorney, with information indicating that 
Alton Logan had not committed the McDonald’s murder.26  
Kunz reported that, “Hope said that [Logan] had nothing to do 
with the McDonald’s case, and that it was Andrew Wilson who 
was with him and Andrew Wilson who shotgunned the security 
guard.”27  According to Kunz’s recollection, when he and 
Coventry confronted Wilson about this claim “Wilson said, 
 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  CBS News, 26-Year Secret Kept Innocent Man In Prison, (Mar. 6, 2008), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/26-year-secret-kept-innocent-man-in-prison; 
Possley, supra note 12. . 
 18.  Possley, supra note 12. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Possley, supra note 12. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
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‘Yeah’ or ‘Uh-huh,’ nodded, grinned, and said, ‘That was 
me.’ ” 28  Coventry also recalled that Wilson “kind of chuckled 
over the fact that someone else was charged with something he 
did.”29 
Coventry and Kunz were bound by legal ethics rules not to 
disclose any of the conversation between them and Andrew 
Wilson.30  Without Wilson’s express permission, their 
conversation was confidential, and Coventry and Kunz’s 
metaphorical hands were tied.31  On March 17, 1982, in the 
hope that they may one day be able to reveal their conversation 
with Andrew Wilson, the two assistant public defenders drew 
up an affidavit stating, “I have obtained information through 
privileged sources that a man named Alton Logan who was 
charged with the fatal shooting of Lloyd Wickliffe at on or 
about 11 Jan. 82 is in fact not responsible for that shooting that 
in fact another person was responsible.”32  Coventry and Kunz 
both signed the affidavit, as well as a witness and notary 
public.33  The affidavit was then sealed in a metal box, held by 
Coventry, until after Andrew Wilson’s death twenty-five years 
later on November 19, 2007.34  Kunz stated that they prepared 
the document “so that if we were ever able to speak up, no one 
could say we were just making this up now.”35 
Harold Winston, a Cook County Assistant Public 
Defender, was representing Alton Logan at the time of Andrew 
Wilson’s death.36  He was aware of the rumor that for years, 
“Coventry and Kunz had information about Andrew Wilson’s 
involvement in the McDonald’s case.”37  After Wilson’s death, 
he contacted Kunz.38  Kunz then contacted Coventry, and he 
located the metal box and unsealed the envelope that he had 
been faithfully keeping for over twenty-five years.39  Coventry 
and Kunz were then summoned to court on January 11, 2008, 
“where Criminal Court Judge James Schreier ruled that they 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Possley, supra note 12. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Possley, supra note 12.  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
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could reveal the conversation [they had with Andrew] Wilson 
and the contents of the affidavit.”40 
On April 18, 2008, after twenty-six years in prison, Alton 
Logan’s conviction was set aside.41  Logan was released on bail, 
pending a new trial.42  On September 4, 2008, the Illinois 
Attorney General’s office dismissed the charges against Logan 
stating it was unable to prove Logan’s guilt.43  Judge Schreier 
supported the decision, stating, “From all that I have heard, 
Mr. Logan, you did not commit this murder.”44  Alton Logan 
responded, “I’ve been telling everybody for the last 26 years, ‘I 
didn’t do this,’ and finally they did the right thing. . . . I’m 
happy that I can finally get on with my life, try to do some of 
the things I want to do.”45  Later, Logan reported to 60 
Minutes, “I never stopped giving up hope. I’ve always believed 
that one day is gone—somebody’s gonna come forth and tell the 
truth. But I didn’t know when.”46 
Coventry and Kunz were faced with a strange dilemma, 
though unfortunately one that is not uncommon in the legal 
system.47  In their interview with 60 minutes, correspondent 
Bob Simon remarked that they “chose to allow [Alton Logan] 
to rot away in jail.”48  Coventry replied, “It seems that way. But 
had we come forward right away, aside from violating our own 
client’s privilege, and putting him in jeopardy, would the 
information that we had have been valued? Would it have 
proved anything?”49  Coventry and Kunz believe it would never 
have been allowed in court.50  As they felt there was no way 
out, they at least did what they believed to be their best option: 
write the affidavit and get Andrew Wilson’s permission to 
 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Maurice Possley, “I’m Not Bitter,” Says Man Who Spent 26 Years in 
Prison for Allegedly Murdering a Security Guard (May 6, 2008), Chicago Tribune, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-05-06/news/0805050781_1_murdering-
judge-james-schreier-new-trial. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Matthew Walberg, South Side Man finally free after 26 years, Chicago 
Tribune (Sept. 5, 2008). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  CBS News, supra note 17. 
 47.  See infra Parts II.B, II.C. 
 48.  CBS News, supra note 17. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. (concluding that the information would never have been allowed in 
court because it was a violation of attorney-client privilege). 
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reveal what he told them after his death.51 
Logan’s case represents two major problems within the 
legal system.  The first is the issue of confidentiality, and the 
loophole which allows an innocent man to remain imprisoned 
for twenty-six years while the true perpetrator remains 
unpunished for their crimes.52  The second issue is, had they 
come forward with the confession earlier, the system may have 
turned away such exculpatory evidence, effectively putting the 
constitutional rights of a confessed guilty party above the 
constitutional rights of an innocent man sitting in jail for a 
crime he did not commit.53  Perhaps this sounds completely 
absurd and improbable, but the next few sample cases will 
demonstrate the concerns raised by Coventry and Kunz in the 
Logan case. 
B. Lee Wayne Hunt Case 
Lee Wayne Hunt and Jerry Cashwell were both separately 
convicted in 1986 of killing Roland and Lisa Matthews..54  The 
Matthews had been shot execution style and had their throats 
slit in their home near Fayetteville, North Carolina.55  Lee 
Wayne Hunt was convicted based in large part on FBI 
testimony regarding bullet analysis, testimony later 
discredited by the FBI.56  In 2005 the FBI reported that 
composite bullet lead analysis was found to be scientifically 
invalid.57  While conceding that the FBI’s testimony was 
unreliable, prosecutors still argued that Hunt’s conviction 
should stand due to two witnesses implicating him in the 
murders.58  Both of those witnesses, one a prison informant, 
were provided plea deals at the time in exchange for their 
testimony.59  The circumstantial evidence matching bullets to 
Hunt stood unchallenged until 2002.60 
 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  See infra Part III.B. 
 53.  See infra Part IV. 
 54.  John Solomon, The End of a Failed Technique—but Not of a Prison 
Sentence, The Washington Post (Nov. 18, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/17/AR2007111701641.html. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Solomon, supra note 54. 
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In 2002, after serving more than a decade in prison for the 
killings of Roland and Lisa Matthews, Jerry Cashwell 
committed suicide.61  Prosecutors had long maintained that 
Hunt participated in the killings, and Cashwell did nothing to 
refute them.62  However, after Cashwell’s death, Staples 
Hughes, the public defender who represented Cashwell at 
trial, came forward with information that Cashwell confessed 
to him in private that he had single handedly killed the 
Matthews after an argument over the television being too 
loud.63  According to Hughes, “Lee Wayne Hunt had nothing to 
do with it.”64  Hughes decided to testify regarding Cashwell’s 
confession after his client’s death stating that, “it seemed to me 
at that point ethically permissible and morally imperative that 
I spill the beans.”65  Unfortunately, unlike the Alton Logan 
case, Hughes never received permission from Cashwell to 
reveal his secrets after death.66 
The Cumberland County Superior Court in Fayetteville 
did not agree with Hughes.67  At the 2007 hearing for Hunt’s 
request for a new trial, Judge Jack A. Thompson told Hughes 
to stop.68  Judge Thompson warned Hughes, “If you testify . . . 
I will be compelled to report you to the state bar. Do you 
understand that?”69  Despite the dire warning, Hughes decided 
to continue.70  Hughes told Judge Thompson that he had 
“never, ever, ever before violated a client’s confidence . . . [b]ut 
Jerry’s dead. My disclosure can’t hurt him and I have to weigh 
that disclosure against the continuing harm” to Lee Wayne 
Hunt.71  Judge Thompson refused to consider the evidence, 
writing in his opinion that Hughes committed professional 
misconduct.72  Staples Hughes was reported to the bar for 
violating attorney-client privilege by revealing what his client 
 
 61.  Adam Liptak, When Law Prevents Righting a Wrong, The New York 
Times (May 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/weekinreview
/04liptak.html. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Liptak, supra note 61. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
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had told him.73 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld Judge 
Thompson’s ruling.74  The North Carolina Supreme Court 
refused to consider new evidence in the case.75  Today, Lee 
Wayne Hunt, now fifty-five years old, still sits in prison after 
serving twenty-eight years and counting.76  Richard Rosen, 
’Hunt’s attorney, stated, “I think as a whole, the judicial 
system of North Carolina should be ashamed of their 
treatment of this case form (sic) top to bottom.”77  The state 
Supreme Court did not offer an explanation for its refusal to 
review the case.78  In 2008 Hunt’s attorneys expressed their 
intention to appeal the case in federal court.79  In a letter 
written by Lee Wayne on September 2014, he stated “that he 
is possibly getting a new trial in federal court.”80 
Once again, we have the situation of a lawyer withholding 
evidence exonerating an innocent man and a judicial system 
blocking his efforts to disclose the evidence after his client’s 
death.  The legal system has placed barriers for unfortunate 
people like Alton Logan and Lee Wayne Hunt to have 
exonerating evidence placed just out of reach.  “Both the 
United States Supreme Court and the North Carolina 
Supreme Court have said the lawyer-client privilege survives 
death, though they recognized that narrow exceptions might 
be possible.”81  Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist writing for 
the majority in a 1998 Supreme Court decision said, “ ‘ [c]lients 
may be concerned about reputation, civil liability or possible 
harm to friends of’ family if their secrets were disclosed after 
they died.”82 
In Lee Wayne Hunt’s case, the battle continues.  The New 
 
 73.  See Liptak, supra note 61.  
 74.  Supreme Court Refuses to Consider Hunt’s Appeal, Fayetteville Observer, 
Jan. 25 2008, 2008 WLNR 1496357.  
 75.  WRAL Local News, State Supreme Court Won’t Hear Murder Appeal on 
Bullet Evidence, (Feb. 2, 2008), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/2388477. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Free Lee Wayne Hunt Now, Facebook (last visited Dec. 12, 2014, 2:56 
PM), https://www.facebook.com/FreeLeeWayneHuntNow. (posting that a letter 
was received from Lee Wayne). 
 81.  Liptak, supra note 61.  
 82.  Id. (quoting Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 407 (1998)). 
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York Times asked legal ethics professor Monroe Freedman, for 
his opinion on the case.83  Professor Freedman said that, “[i]f 
there is no threat of civil action against the client’s estate and 
there are no survivors who continue to believe in the client’s 
innocence, . . . there is no confidentiality obligation to begin 
with.”84  Hughes agreed, “[w]hat reputational interest did 
Jerry have? . . .  He had pleaded guilty to killing two people. 
He didn’t have an estate. His estate was a pair of shower shoes 
and two paperback books.”85 
Lee Wayne Hunt had to wait, like Alton Logan, until the 
confessed killer died to gain access to the confidential 
information held by lawyers adhering to the rules of legal 
ethics.86  Now, he also faces the arduous task of convincing a 
court to consider the exonerating evidence and dismiss the case 
against him.  The legal system prevents certain evidence from 
being admitted in a criminal court to ensure that a person 
found guilty was given a fair trial.87  Should these same rules 
be used to bar exculpatory evidence from being used to fix an 
injustice and free an innocent man? 
C. Macumber Case 
In 1962 a young couple was murdered in the desert north 
of Scottsdale, Arizona.88  That murder went unsolved until 
1974 when Carol Macumber, “a sheriff’s department employee 
going through an ugly divorce,” claimed that her ex-husband, 
Bill Macumber had confessed to the killings.89  Corroborating 
evidence was found in an evidence locker at the sheriff 
department, which Carol had access to.90  What Carol could not 
know is that Ernesto Valenzuela, already “in prison for two 
markedly similar murders, had already bragged to his defense 
counsel, Thomas O’Toole, that he had committed [the 
murders].”91  O’Toole later said that Valenzuela actually 
 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  See supra Part II.A.  
 87.  See supra notes 7–9.  
 88.  Richard Zitrin, Viewpoint: When Can A Lawyer Break Privilege?, The 
Recorder, (Mar. 01, 2013), http://www.uchastings.edu/news/articles/2013/03/
zitrin-breaking-privilege.php. 
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Id.  
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“relished committing the murders.”92 
Following the legal ethics guidelines and abiding by his 
duty of confidentiality, O’Toole said nothing initially.93  If 
O’Toole revealed this information Valenzuela, his client, would 
have been charged with the murder.94  However, just prior to 
Macumber’s arrest in 1973, Valenzuela was killed while in 
prison.95  O’Toole, after first obtaining permission from 
Valenzuela’s mother, agreed to testify at Macumber’s trial.96  
His testimony was not permitted.97 “[F]irst the trial court and 
then the appellate court refused to consider O’Toole’s 
testimony.”.98  Arizona had codified the attorney-client 
privilege99 and the courts ruled that Valenzuela’s privilege 
survived his death and that permission from his mother was 
insufficient.100  The Supreme Court of Arizona also agreed, 
ruling that the attorney-client privilege automatically barred 
O’Toole’s testimony.101  Macumber was convicted.102 
It was not’ until 2009 that Macumber’s case was finally 
brought before the Arizona clemency board.103  With the 
continued assistance of O’Toole and an Arizona innocence 
project, Macumber was able to convince the clemency board 
“that he had be framed by his wife, and that Valenzuela was 
the [true] perpetrator.”104  Unfortunately, that was not 
enough.105  Although the board recommended Macumber’s 
release in 2009 and again in 2012, noting that his conviction 
was a “miscarriage of justice”, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer 
denied clemency.106  Brewer “then fired the majority of the 
board.”107  It was not’ until Macumber made a deal and plead 
no contest to second-degree murder that he was finally freed in 
 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Zitrin, supra note 88.  
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Id.  
 97.  Arizona v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. 1976).  
 98.  Zitrin, supra note 88.  
 99.  Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1086.  
 100.  Zitrin, supra note 88.  
 101.  Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1086.  
 102.  Zitrin, supra note 88.  
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id.  
 106.  Id.  
 107.  Id.  
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late 2012.108  Macumber is free, as a convicted felon, after 
spending 37 years behind bars.109 
In the Arizona Supreme Court case, Arizona v. 
Macumber,110 Justice Holohan filed a specially concurring 
opinion.111  First, Justice Holohan argued that the United 
States Supreme Court in Chambers v. Mississippi,112 “ruled 
that it is a violation of due process for a state rule of evidence 
to preclude the admission of reliable hearsay declarations 
against penal interest when such evidence is offered to show 
the innocence of an accused.”113  According to Justice Holohan, 
the evidence offered by O’Toole is admissible under both 
Arizona and Federal law.114  Second, Justice Holohan argued 
that, “[t]he real problem is whether the privilege can survive 
the constitutional test of due process.”115  Citing United States 
Supreme Court precedents Washington v. Texas116 and Roviaro 
v. United States117, Justice Holohan pointed out that an 
accused has a basic right to present a defense and, in doing so, 
has a right to present witness testimony even in the face of a 
claim of privilege.118  According to Justice Holohan, “[t]he 
problem of balancing competing interests, privilege versus a 
proper defense, is a difficult one, but the balance always 
weighs in favor of achieving a fair determination of the 
cause.”119 
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL ENVIRONMENT SURROUNDING 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY 
The argument has often been made, that a person’s 
constitutional right to present witness testimony should 
outweigh a deceased client’s right to confidentiality.120  While 
 
 108.  Zitrin, supra note 88.  
 109.  Id.  
 110.  Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1084.  
 111.  Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1087.  
 112.  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 
(1973).  
 113.  Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1088 (Holohan, J., specially concurring).  
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).  
 117.  Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957).  
 118.  Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1088 (Holohan, J., specially concurring).  
 119.  Id.  
 120.  See e.g., Inbal Hasbani, When the Law Preserves Injustice: Issues Raised 
by A Wrongful Incarceration Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 100 J. 
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this paper agrees with that view, it also argues that the right 
should weigh in favor of an individual’s constitutional right 
even when the source of the confidential information is still 
living.  This loophole must be closed to prevent such absurd 
forms of injustice in situations like the ones described above. 
While attorney-client privilege and confidentiality of 
information are distinct doctrines, together they function as 
the gatekeeper of client secrets.121  The Supreme Court has 
asserted that a trial is a “search for truth.”122  However, 
maintaining client secrets flies in the face of truth when those 
secrets are kept from the court.  The American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model 
Rules) require devotion to the client despite the consequences 
of maintaining those secrets.123  Not once in the Model Rules, 
upon which most state ethical codes are based, will a direct 
reference to the discovery and production of the truth be 
found.124  Aside from the few exceptions currently allowed, 
strict attorney loyalty is required of all lawyers.125  This has 
been a long accepted standard in the legal profession dating 
back as far as 1820 when Lord Brougham famously described 
a lawyer’s role: 
To save [the] client by all means and expedients, and at all 
hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them,  to 
himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this 
duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the 
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating 
the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go 
on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his 
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.126 
Though certain rules do require that a lawyer not mislead, 
act deceptively, or commit fraud, there is no rule instructing a 
lawyer to proffer the truth.127  “Devotion to the client, not truth, 
 
Crim. L. & Criminology 277, 307 (2010).  
 121.  See Id. at 282.  
 122.  Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 171 (1986).  
 123.  Mod. R. Prof. C. § 1.6 (2014).  
 124.  Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth and Honesty in Representing Clients, 
20 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 209, 213 (2006).  
 125.  Mod. R. Prof. C. § 1.6(b)(1–7) (2014).  
 126.  Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics, 
71–72 (3d ed. 2004) (citing Lord Henry Brougham).  
 127.  Henning, supra note 124.  
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is the lawyer’s ultimate duty.”128  The Model Rules, for 
example, instructs a lawyer to question the credibility of a 
witness the lawyer knows to be truthful.129  The judicial system 
charges a lawyer with the task of being a “zealous advocate for 
the client, putting that person’s interest ahead of all others.”130  
Although attorney-client confidentiality is touted as one of the 
most highly valued precepts in the law, the Model Rules do 
recognize exceptions to confidentiality in certain situations.131 
A. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
Most state ethics rules governing attorney conduct are 
based on the Model Rules.132  A large majority of the states 
have adopted some of the language and the numbering system 
suggested by the Model Rules.133  Every lawyer, while not 
subject to the Model Rules itself, is subject to discipline for a 
breach of the rules of professional conduct adopted by their 
state.134  In order to ensure that lawyers are well informed on 
the Model Rules, law students in all but three U.S. 
jurisdictions (Maryland, Wisconsin, and Puerto Rico) are 
required to take the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination before they may be admitted to the bar in their 
state.135  The Model Rules are a collection of proposed rules 
that provide guidelines for the states to draft their own 
professional conduct rules.136 
B. Confidentiality of Information 
The Model Rules codify confidentiality of information in 
rule 1.6.137  Rule 1.6 provides that, “A lawyer shall not reveal 
 
 128.  Hasbani, supra note 120 at 282.  
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Henning, supra note 124 at 210.  
 131.  Mod. R. Prof. C. 1.6(b)(1–7). See Mod. R. Prof. C. 1.6(c) (providing a list 
of exceptions when a lawyer may reveal confidences such as; the client intends to 
commit a crime, has already used the lawyer’s services for an illegal or fraudulent 
act, or to defend against an accusation of wrongful conduct).  
 132.  Stephen Gillers, Roy D. Simon & Andrew M. Perlman, Regulation of 
Lawyers, Statutes and Standards, 3 (Con. 25th ed. 2014).  
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Id.  
 135.  The Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, National 
Conference of Bar Examiners (last visited Sept. 16. 15, 2015 115:24 AMPM), 
http://www.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-exams/mpre/.  
 136.  Gillers, supra note 132. 
 137.  Gillers, supra note 132 at 30.  
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information relating to the representation of a client unless the 
client gives informed consent. . . .  ”138  This covers a very 
extensive range of information that a lawyer must keep 
confidential. The purpose in providing such an expansive 
protection is so that every client may receive competent 
representation as allotted by the constitution.139  Competent 
representation requires that a lawyer be “fully informed of all 
the facts of the matter he is handling.”140  The widely held belief 
is that clients will not provide a lawyer with full disclosure 
without that promise of confidentiality.141 
Benefits aside, confidentiality is at odds with the truth.  
The Fifth Amendment provides protection against self-
incrimination.142  An advocate, aware of his client’s guilt, must 
not reveal that fact to the court.  As every person has a right to 
competent representation,143 which requires full disclosure to 
a person’s lawyer, as well as a right not to incriminate one’’s 
self, there must be a way to maintain both in a criminal case.  
Model Rule 1.6 is that answer, and it is meant to be upheld in 
all but the few cases where an exception applies.  Adherence to 
this rule means that evidence of a person’s guilt will be hidden 
from court proceedings, sometimes allowing the guilty to go 
free.  The courts have accepted this as “the price that society 
must pay for the availability of justice to every citizen, which 
is the value that the privilege is designed to secure.”144  They 
have explained that the “social good derived from the proper 
performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their 
clients . . . outweighs the harm that may come from the 
suppression of the evidence.”145 
C. Attorney-Client Privilege 
The United States Supreme Court recognized that the 
attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized 
privileges of the different confidential communications.146  The 
 
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Freedman & Smith, supra note 126.  
 140.  Id. at 129. (Citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981)). 
 141.  Hasbani, supra note 120 at 286.  
 142.  Supra note 8.  
 143.  Supra note 9. 
 144.  In re A John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 408 Mass. 480, 482 
(1990)(quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983)).  
 145.  Id.  
 146.  Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).  
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basis for this privilege is premised on the theory that 
encouraging clients to make “full and frank” disclosures 
provides their attorneys the ability to offer candid legal advice 
and effective representation.147  The United States Supreme 
Court has stated that the, “public benefit in encouraging 
clients to fully communicate . . . outweighs the harm caused by 
the loss of relevant information.”148 
While the attorney-client privilege is not expressly codified 
in the Model Rules, Rule 1.6 provides similar protection.149  
The attorney-client privilege is derived from common law and 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.150  Each state may adopt their 
own version of the attorney-client privilege and, just as the 
Model Rules provide guidance, Proposed Federal Rule of 
Evidence 503 (Rule 503), also can assist in the creation of state 
rules governing attorney-client privilege.151  Under Rule 503, 
“[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent 
any other person from disclosing confidential communications 
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client.”152 
Thus, ethically, the combination of Model Rule 1.6 
requiring a lawyer not to reveal “information relating to the 
representation of a client” and Rule 503 preventing disclosure 
of any “confidential communications made for the purpose of 
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services,” 
requires an attorney to keep secret almost anything he may 
learn from his client.153  The combination of these two doctrines  
fortify the rights every individual has to competent 
representation without self incrimination. Although attorney-
 
 147.  UpJohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).  
 148.  Id.  
 149.  Sue Michmerhuizen, Confidentiality, Privilege: A Basic Value in Two 
Different Applications, American BarAssociation (May 2007) http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/co
nfidentiality_or_attorney.authcheckdam.pdf (explaining that attorney-client 
privilege only protects the essence of communications by the client and lawyer, 
extending to information given for the purpose of obtaining legal representation, 
while client-lawyer confidentiality is much more extensive, covering all 
information relating to the representation regardless of whether the information 
came from the client or any other source). 
 150.  Proposed Fed. R. of Evid. § 503. 
 151.  Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence Manual 
§ 18.03[1](8th ed. 2007).  
 152.  Supra note 150.  
 153.  Supra notes 131 and 150.  
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client confidentiality is generally upheld, there are certain 
situations in which the ethical guidelines have deemed 
exceptions acceptable.154  The Model Rules provide seven 
exceptions when a lawyer may be allowed to reveal confidential 
information.155  Relevant to this discussion is Model Rule 
1.6(b)(1) providing a lawyer the ability to break confidentiality 
in order “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial 
bodily harm.”156 
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM 
In the cases described above, the legal system not only 
allowed, but also staunchly defended the right of a confessed 
guilty party over the rights of individuals falsely accused.  A 
legal system that would knowingly allow an innocent person to 
remain in jail or face execution, while the true perpetrator 
remains protected by client confidentiality is a broken legal 
system.  These cases, especially those of Alton Logan and Lee 
Wayne Hunt garnered quite a bit of media attention.157  CBS 
News’ 60 Minutes aired specials on both cases.158  The 
heightened attention brought this issue to the forefront in 
academic and journalistic circles.159  Much of the discussion has 
centered around the question of, “how our society can allow 
lawyers to keep secrets about a man’s innocence for decades 
because of some seemingly attenuated notion of confidentiality 
owed to a client imprisoned for murder, even, in some cases, 
after that client dies.”160  One wonders “how we can praise 
defense lawyers who wait half a lifetime until their client dies 
before revealing that a long-imprisoned man is innocent, while 
criticizing and even punishing them if they say anything while 
the client is still alive.”161  While we can praise those lawyers 
for having such a commitment to the ethical rules, I propose 
that there should be no such commitment required.  In the face 
of such a tremendous injustice, the rules must change. 
 
 154.  Supra note 131.  
 155.  Id.  
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Hasbani, supra note 120 at 277.  
 158.  CBS News, supra note 17.  
 159.  Zitrin, supra note 88.  
 160.  Id.  
 161.  Id.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The two most common arguments that supports breaching 
confidentiality where the client holding the privilege still lives 
are: 1) the line should be drawn at life and death, allowing 
breach of confidentiality when a person is sentenced to death162 
and 2) the Model Rules exception to substantial bodily harm 
should be read to include incarceration.163  There are also 
currently two states that have adopted rules of professional 
conduct that specifically allow a lawyer to reveal confidential 
information in cases of wrongful incarceration.164  
Massachusetts and Alaska have each adopted similar 
modifications to Model Rule 1.6.165  Both states allow a lawyer 
to reveal confidential information in order to prevent the 
“wrongful execution or incarceration of another.”166  This 
section will proceed to analyze both solutions, as well as the 
modified rules adopted by Massachusetts and Alaska, and 
discuss whether any are sufficient to assist in cases such as 
those illustrated above. 
A. Drawing the Line at Life and Death 
Drawing the line at life and death could potentially cover 
two arguments: 1) that confidential information should be 
revealed when an innocent person is facing the death penalty 
and 2) that confidential information should be revealed when 
the client holding the privilege is no longer alive.  While both 
of these arguments provide exceptions that may help in certain 
situations, as will be explained, they would be unavailable to 
help in most cases of wrongful incarceration.  In the cases 
where these exceptions would be available, the protection 
afforded is not enough. 
Under the Model Rules, a lawyer may reveal confidential 
information in order to prevent reasonably certain death.167  
According to the drafter’s comments to the Model Rules, 
“[s]uch harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered 
 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Colin Miller, Ordeal by Innocence: Why There Should Be A Wrongful 
Incarceration/Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102 Nw. 
U.L. Rev. Colloquy 391, 393 (2008).  
 164.  Mass. R. Prof. C. § 1.6 (2013), Ak. R. Prof. C. § 1.6 (2014).  
 165.  Id.  
 166.  Id.  
 167.  Supra note 123. 
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imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that 
a person will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails 
to take action necessary to eliminate the threat.”168  This vague 
definition has left open to interpretation when a threat meets 
the definition of “imminent” and “substantial” so as to allow 
revelation.  Some studies have provided that being convicted 
and sentenced to death may not meet the requirement for 
imminent harm.169  The harm in being sentenced to death may 
not be realized for many years, as the person convicted will 
likely endure many appeals before actually facing death. 
Professor Freedman, considered to be a legal ethics giant 
and one of the strongest defenders of confidentiality, told the 
New York Times that he would “draw the line at the life-and-
death situation” before revealing a confidence.170  According to 
Freedman, it would make the exception far too broad to 
“extend it to incarceration in general.”171  Freedman also noted, 
however, that if the holder of the privilege were dead, and 
“there is no threat of civil action against the client’s estate and 
there are no survivors who continue to believe in the client’s 
innocence,” then perhaps a broader exception would be 
justified.172 
These exceptions both fall short in the cases of Alton 
Logan, Lee Wayne Hunt and the many others like them. 
Forcing an innocent person to endure decades in prison for a 
crime he or she did not commit, only to be freed once the actual 
perpetrator dies is not justice.  There are three major problems 
with this approach: 1) the statute allows a lawyer to reveal the 
confidential information, it does not require it;173 2) there is too 
much room for interpretation allowing a different result in 
different jurisdictions and; 3) under this exception, a person 
may still remain in prison for years before gaining access to 
evidence proving their innocence, and risks a chance that the 
information will be lost before it can be revealed. 
 
 
 
 168.  Id. at Comment 6.  
 169.  Miller, supra note 163 at 395–97. 
 170.  Zitrin, supra note 88.  
 171.  Id.  
 172.  Id.  
 173.  Supra note 123.  
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B. Reading the Model Rules to Include Incarceration 
within the Substantial Bodily Harm Exception 
Reading the Model Rules to include incarceration within 
the substantial bodily harm exception rests upon the 
interpretation that incarceration itself is a substantial bodily 
harm. Arguably, incarceration in any form may be construed 
as harm, but is it “substantial bodily harm” as required under 
the exception?  Only when the wrongful incarceration of an 
innocent man falls within the definition of “substantial bodily 
harm” under Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) may a lawyer reveal the 
confidential information to prevent or correct it.174 
In order to determine the meaning of “substantial bodily 
harm” under Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), we must look to the 
structure of the Model Rule.175  The comments following each 
Model Rule “explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose 
of the Rule.”176  “The Comments are intended as guides to 
interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative.”177  
The information that helps provide interpretation of 
substantial bodily harm is contained in Comment 6, which 
provides:178 
Paragraph (b)(1) recognized the overriding value of life and 
physical integrity and permits disclosure necessary to 
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm. Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be 
suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial 
threat that a person will suffer such harm at a later date if 
the lawyer fails to take action necessary to  eliminate the 
threat.179 
The comment provides that an interpretation of 
substantial bodily harm must include two things; 1) the harm 
must be “reasonably certain to occur”; and 2) it must be 
suffered imminently OR have a present and substantial threat 
that it will occur at a later date if a lawyer does not take 
action.180  In order to further assist in the interpretation of 
substantial harm, Comment 6 also provides an example of a 
 
 174.  Id.  
 175.  Id.  
 176.  Gillers, supra note 132 at 14.  
 177.  Id.  
 178.  Gillers, supra note 132 at 31.  
 179.  Gillers, supra note 132 at 31–32. 
 180.  Supra note 123 at Comment 6.  
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situation in which a lawyer can reveal confidential information 
under this rule: 
[A] lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally 
discharged toxic waste into a town’s water supply may 
reveal this information to the authorities if there is a 
present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the 
water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease 
and the lawyer’s disclosure is necessary to eliminate the 
threat or reduce the number of victims.181 
Thus, we may construe from the hypothetical posed in 
Comment 6, that the harm need not be the product of a 
criminal act, nor must it be imminent if the harm is likely to 
occur without the lawyer’s intervention. 
Colin Miller, an associate professor of law at the 
University of South Carolina School of Law, has provided an 
interesting interpretation that may be construed to include 
wrongful imprisonment as a substantial bodily harm.182  Miller 
bases his argument on the fact that three acts are statistically 
more likely to occur to an individual in prison.183  According to 
various studies cited by Miller, an inmate faces an increased 
risk of physical violence, a heightened rate of contracting 
communicable diseases, and is subject to an increased risk of 
same sex rape.184  Comparing this increase risk factor to a 
situation where a lawyer reasonably believes his client may 
physically harm another person, Miller writes, “if we believe 
that the risk of an intended assault and battery victim actually 
suffering from substantial bodily harm is analogous to the 
aggregate increased risk of a prisoner suffering from violence, 
contracting a communicable disease, or being raped, disclosure 
should be permitted or required in the wrongful incarceration 
scenario.”185  Thus, by being incarcerated, a prisoner is likely 
to incur harm unless the lawyer intervenes. 
Miller provides a well thought out argument for revelation 
of confidential information under the current rules.186  Most 
states have adopted some form of Model Rule 1.6 or have a 
 
 181.  Id.  
 182.  See generally Miller, supra note 163.  
 183.  Miller, supra note 163 at 397–98.  
 184.  Id.  
 185.  Id. at 398.  
 186.  Id. at 402.  
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similar rule.187  In those states, Miller’s argument may provide 
a possible solution. However, this method of interpretation still 
provides insufficient protection for known innocent parties 
wrongfully incarcerated.  There are three major issues with 
this approach: 1) revealing confidential information of a living 
client violates their Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate 
themselves; 2) there is too much room for interpretation 
allowing a different result in different jurisdictions; and 3) this 
interpretation still only allows a lawyer to reveal the 
confidential information, it does not require it. 
C. Modifying Rule 1.6 to Allow Revelation to Prevent 
Wrongful Execution or Incarceration of Another 
Modifying Model Rule 1.6 to specifically allow revelation 
in the case of wrongful incarceration would eliminate the 
guesswork for a lawyer faced with a scenario similar to the 
example cases.  Simply allowing revelation of confidential 
information in order to prevent or rectify a wrongful 
incarceration would provide a much broader scope of 
exemptions to Model Rule 1.6.  Adoption of such a rule would 
require an institutional choice to place the rights of those 
wrongfully incarcerated above the rights of the confessed 
lawbreaker.  Considering the inverse view can lead to grave 
injustices against the innocent, as exemplified above, it should 
not be a difficult leap to make.188 
Two states have adopted a specific exception to prevent the 
wrongful execution or incarceration of another.189  
Massachusetts and Alaska have adopted similar text in their 
versions of Model Rule 1.6 that specifically allow a lawyer to 
reveal confidential information in order to prevent the 
“wrongful execution or incarceration of another.”190  Both 
states still provide that the lawyer exercise discretion deciding 
whether to disclose, it does not require disclosure.191 
Massachusetts Rule 1.6(b)(1) provides that a lawyer may 
reveal confidential information “to prevent the commission of 
 
 187.  James E. Moliterno, Rectifying Wrongful Convictions: May A Lawyer 
Reveal Her Client’s Confidences to Rectify the Wrongful Conviction of Another?, 
38 Hastings Const. L.Q. 811, appendix (2011).  
 188.  See example cases supra Part II.  
 189.  Supra note 164.  
 190.  Id.  
 191.  Id.  
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a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably 
believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, 
or in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of 
another, or to prevent the wrongful execution or incarceration 
of another.”192  Massachusetts comment [6A] further provides 
that Rule 1.6(b)(1) “also permits a lawyer to reveal confidential 
information in the specific situation where such information 
discloses that an innocent person has been convicted of a crime 
and has been sentenced to imprisonment or execution.”193  
Thus, a lawyer is permitted to reveal confidential information 
only after a known innocent person has been sentenced to 
imprisonment.  A conviction without a prison sentence still 
requires a lawyer to maintain his clients secret. Currently, 
there are no legal opinions or cases that apply this particular 
exception in Massachusetts. 
Alaska Rule 1.6(b)(1)(C) provides that, “A lawyer may 
reveal a client’s confidence or secret to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain. . .  
wrongful execution or incarceration of another.”194  The Alaska 
Comment notes that, “In paragraph (b)(1)(C), the court 
included an additional limited exception to the normal rule 
requiring lawyers to preserve the confidences and secrets of 
their clients.  This provision is modeled on the similar 
Massachusetts rule: its core purpose is to permit a lawyer to 
reveal confidential information in the specific situation in 
which that information discloses that an innocent person has 
been convicted of a crime and has been sentenced to 
imprisonment or execution.”195  Analogous to the 
Massachusetts exception, a lawyer in Alaska may, at their 
discretion, reveal confidential information after an innocent 
person has been incarcerated. 
While the addition of specific rules is a step in the right 
direction, they still fall short of protecting the rights of all the 
parties involved.  These rules certainly hold the possibility that 
a lawyer could choose to assist an innocent person wrongfully 
imprisoned but it does not require it.  The addition of a 
wrongful incarceration exception solves the dilemma of a 
lawyer who is unsure whether or not they may reveal 
 
 192.  Mass. R. Prof. C. § 1.6 (2013).  
 193.  Id. at Comment [6A].  
 194.  Ak. R. Prof. C. § 1.6 (2014).  
 195.  Id. at Alaska Comment.  
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confidential information, but it still leaves unsolved two of the 
major issues: 1) revealing confidential information of a living 
client violates their Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate 
themselves, possibly subjecting them to prosecution; and 2) 
this statute still only allows a lawyer to reveal the confidential 
information, it does not require it. 
The Problems Inherent to Establishing a New Exception 
To resolve this moral and ethical duality, each issue must 
be defused. In order to provide the protection from wrongful 
incarceration a known innocent is entitled there must be a 
balance. Aside from the issues presented in the solutions 
proposed above, there are also concerns about the impact such 
an exception would have on attorney-client confidentiality.196  
In order to better extrapolate a practical solution, we must 
take into consideration every issue. 
A statute that would presume to assist the wrongfully 
incarcerated must be written narrowly, allowing no room for 
interpretation amongst jurisdictions.  It should make 
revelation of confidential information mandatory.  Allowing 
revelation of confidential information to be optional in the case 
of wrongful incarceration is not likely to produce a large influx 
of defense attorney’s coming forward with their client’s 
confidential information.197  Defense lawyers’ loyalty to their 
client’s is not based solely on the Model Rules.  The average 
defense lawyer will likely resist a rule forcing them to 
implicate their client in another crime.198  Their job is to 
zealously defend their client, even in the face of known guilt.199  
If the revelation of a client’s secret is optional, no doubt most 
criminal defense lawyers would balk at exercising that option.  
The practice of law is a business, and who would choose to hire 
a criminal defense attorney who has a reputation for breaching 
confidentiality when it was not required? 
A hypothetical posed by Professor Fred C. Zacharias in 
Rethinking Confidentiality illustrates the problem of an 
optional rule.200 He presented the following scenario: “A client 
 
 196.  Hasbani supra note 120 at 284.  
 197.  See Hasbani supra note 120 at 299–303 (citing Leslie Levin, Testing the 
Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who Intend to Harm 
Others, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 81, 97 (1994)).  
 198.  Id.  
 199.  Id.  
 200.  Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 404 
(1989). 
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makes her attorney the following proposition: ‘If I double your 
fee, would you waive your right to disclose?’ ” 201  Professor 
Zacharias warns that drafters of a new code must decide 
whether clients and attorneys should be allowed to change 
confidentiality contractually.202  However, even barring a 
contractual limit, what will keep a lawyer from negotiating his 
silence if his disclosure is merely optional? 
Finally, there must be a consideration of the effect a new 
exception to confidentiality would have on the attorney client 
relationship.  Many proponents for a new exception worry that 
a new exception might chill communication between a client 
and their attorney.203  Those opposed to further exceptions 
“contend that confidentiality exceptions will interfere with the 
development of client trust and will discourage clients from 
using or freely communicating with their counsel.”204  An 
optional rule would contribute even further to this problem.  
Without clear guidelines lawyers would increasingly be 
saddled with the dilemma of whether or not to reveal 
confidential information, an inconsistency that may result in 
distrust between a client and his attorney.  A mandatory rule 
provides assurance to a client by letting them know how their 
attorney is going respond. This knowledge in itself speaks for 
a lawyer’s integrity, rather than constantly questioning 
whether a lawyer would decide to reveal information based on 
their personal sense of right or wrong. 
Many studies have been conducted about the potential 
effects that confidentiality exceptions have on the candid and 
frank disclosure by clients.205  These studies have uncovered 
that many attorneys do not discuss the subject of mandatory 
disclosures “because they [felt] that discussions about 
confidentiality exceptions would interfere with client trust.”206  
In those cases, when mandatory disclosure requires a lawyer 
to reveal his client’s information, that client is more likely to 
distrust an attorney and the legal profession in general.  
Unfortunately, these studies have also concluded that a typical 
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client will not understand the complexities of the rule of 
confidentiality and its exceptions.207  A clients 
misunderstanding of attorney-client confidentiality coupled 
with the fact that attorneys choose not to explain possible 
exceptions could lead to a general assumption that lawyers 
‘hide the ball’ and are not up front and honest. 
A significant contrast found in these studies is that 
discussing disclosure exceptions with a client may actually 
reduce “the likelihood that clients will say any more about the 
subject.”208  Warning clients about all the possible exceptions 
available to an attorney before discussing a case would almost 
certainly lead to inhibited discussion as the client would closely 
consider everything he wants to reveal before revealing it.  If 
an attorney counsels a client about a wrongful incarceration 
exception, the client may choose to withhold that information 
and essentially making a new exception self-defeating. Given 
the importance of preventing wrongful incarceration, a new 
exception would at least afford an attorney in the position of 
receiving such information the ability to prevent the injustice. 
As a society, we have relied on the proposition that 
allowing the guilty to go free on occasion is more acceptable 
than allowing an innocent to remain in prison.  It is with this 
maxim in mind that the following solution is proposed, which 
permits an exception with a consideration to all issues. 
V. A MANDATORY EXCEPTION FOR WRONGFUL 
INCARCERATION SHOULD BE ADOPTED 
The current exceptions to Model Rule 1.6 afford attorney’s 
very broad discretion.  The fact that, as of this writing, I was 
unable to find a single reported case of an attorney coming 
forward based on the Massachusetts or Alaska wrongful 
incarceration statutes supports the theory that an optional 
rule may not be effective.  A mandatory rule would at least 
guarantee that the person wrongfully incarcerated would have 
a means of obtaining the truth. 
In a wrongful incarceration scenario, where an attorney 
reveals confidential information of his client, we still have the 
problem of the clients Fifth Amendment privilege.  The Fifth 
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Amendment prevents “the use, in a criminal prosecution, of a 
defendant’s testimony elicited by compulsion.”209 (emphasis 
added). The Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States held that 
an attorney cannot be compelled to break the attorney-client 
privilege, as it would be a violation of the clients Fifth 
Amendment right.210  Fisher ascertained that any information 
that would be protected under the Fifth Amendment for the 
individual must also be protected by their lawyer.211 In a 
wrongful incarceration situation however, it is not the 
compulsion to elicit information that triggers a Fifth 
Amendment violation, it is triggered if used against that 
person.  In order to resolve this problem of violating the 
confessed criminal’s Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate 
themselves, use of immunity for the confessing client must be 
part of the solution. 
Use of immunity prevents the prosecution from using the 
confidential information elicited by compulsion against the 
criminal defendant.212  In the case of a wrongful incarceration 
situation, the elicited confidential information would be used 
to free the innocent, but it would be unavailable in a criminal 
prosecution against the client.  Without use of immunity, any 
attorney who reveals confidential information that is used 
against a client in a criminal prosecution is a violation of the 
client’s constitutional rights. 
Use of immunity in these cases would not necessarily 
constitute a get out of jail free card for self-confessed criminals.  
An attorney under these circumstances would only reveal 
confidential information to the extent necessary to ascertain 
the innocence of a person wrongfully incarcerated.  While any 
information revealed by the attorney would be protected from 
use, it would not prevent the prosecution from continuing to 
investigate the unsolved crime and prosecuting the client 
based on independent evidence. 
Use of immunity would protect a guilty client’s 
constitutional rights at the expense of the evidence presented 
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to prove the innocence of a person wrongfully incarcerated.  Its 
use may be looked upon with disdain by victims and their 
families, knowing that the actual criminal cannot be held 
responsible for the crime in some situations. Even more 
difficult to accept is the knowledge that the self-confessed 
criminals who benefit from this rule may be free from 
prosecution and have the ability to continue committing 
similar crimes.  The Supreme Court has said that the “social 
good derived from the proper performance of the function of 
lawyers acting for their clients . . . outweighs the harm that 
may come from the suppression of evidence.”213  This reasoning 
should also apply to the social good of righting the injustice of 
wrongful incarceration. 
A mandatory wrongful incarceration exception to the 
attorney-client privilege provides a solution to all the issues 
presented.214  While there are certainly serious drawbacks to 
this type of an exception, those drawbacks will likely still exist 
without an exception and an innocent person will be 
incarcerated for a crime he did not commit.  The guilty party 
whose confessed crime remains confidential will still be free to 
commit similar crimes.  While the victims and their family may 
feel better believing the responsible party is being held 
responsible, their comfort in a false belief does not justify the 
unjust suffering of an innocent person. 
The following proposed modification to Model Rule 1.6215 
should be adopted: 
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client unless the client gives informed 
consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry 
out the representation or the disclosure is permitted or 
required by paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal, and must reveal in subsection 
(8), information relating to the representation of a client to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(Exceptions 1 through 7 excluded) 
(8) to rectify the wrongful execution or 
incarceration of another; a person whose information is 
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revealed in this manner is granted use immunity for the 
information provided. 
This proposed modification should include a comment 
similar to Massachusetts’s comment [6A] permitting “a lawyer 
to reveal confidential information in the specific situation 
where such information discloses that an innocent person has 
been convicted of a crime and has been sentenced to 
imprisonment or execution.”216  The requirement that the 
innocent person has already been convicted and sentenced is 
absolutely necessary.  Without a wrongful conviction 
requirement, there would be many self-confessed criminals 
attempting to take advantage of use immunity when revelation 
may not be necessary.  The innocent person may still be found 
innocent by a court of law.  The revelation of confidential 
information and subsequent granting of use immunity should 
only be used after an innocent person has been convicted and 
sentenced and the guilty party has essentially gotten away 
with their crime. 
Granting use immunity also provides a solution to the 
client-trust issue.  A client is more apt to trust a lawyer who 
discloses that he may be required to reveal confidential 
information, even against his will, and that any information 
disclosed will not be used to harm the client. In these cases, the 
attorney may even be seen as having more integrity obeying 
the rules while preventing harm to his client.  With use of 
immunity required under the Fifth Amendment, the likelihood 
that this new exception would chill communication between 
clients and their attorneys would be minimal and any damage 
to the client lawyer trust relationship would be far outweighed 
by the injustice done to an innocent person wrongfully 
incarcerated. 
CONCLUSION 
Wrongful incarceration is a grievously unfortunate flaw in 
the legal system.  In most cases, when an innocent person is 
wrongfully convicted, the truth is only ever known by the guilty 
parties and the unfortunate person wrongfully convicted.  In 
those rare cases where a lawyer, who is an officer of the court, 
knows the truth, failure to right this wrong is an unacceptable 
breakdown within the justice system. 
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A wrongful incarceration exception is not a perfect 
solution.  The solution posed by this paper allows the 
possibility that a client who confesses to murder may never be 
prosecuted for the murder.  Contrast that scenario with one in 
which the murderer is never prosecuted because an innocent 
person was found guilty for their crime and serving life in 
prison or facing capital punishment. The choice is an obvious 
one.  A system founded upon the ideal “That it is better 100 
guilty Persons should escape than that one innocent Person 
should suffer” should readily embrace a wrongful incarceration 
exception.  The solution proposed in this paper that chooses to 
right the wrong to the innocent rather than preserving the 
right to prosecute the guilty is consistent with that maxim. 
 
